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We provide empirical estimates of the risksharing and redistributive properties of fiscal equalization
among the states of the German federation. Fiscal equalization serves as a mechanism to insure state
budgets against asymmetric revenue shocks, but provides almost no insurance against regional
income shocks. Equalization responds only weakly to income differentials but strongly to tax revenue
differentials across states. A further result is that the correlation of state tax revenues with state GDPs
has declined over time. This may reflect a weakening in state tax efforts in response to the adverse
incentive effects of fiscal equalization.1
Nontechnical Summary
Fiscal arrangements for sharing income risk and redistributing income across different
regions of a national state or across the states forming a federation have received
considerable interest in recent research. Much of this interest was sparked by the
preparation of European Monetary Union during the 1990s where a fiscal tax and transfer
system has been considered as an alternative to the exchange rate instrument for absorbing
asymmetric shocks. Other contributions have looked at the role of the fiscal system in
improving the performance of economies with incomplete capital markets that do not allow
consumers to insure against regionally asymmetric shocks. Much of the empirical work in this
area has been done using data from the US and Canada.
In this paper, we analyze the risksharing and redistributive properties of Germany’s system
of fiscal equalization, the principal arrangement for tax revenue sharing and transfers among
the states of the German federation and between these and the federal government. We use
data from 1961 to 1994, the last year before the inclusion of the East german states in the
system, for a panel analysis. We are interested in two main aspects of the system: To what
extent does it provide insurance against asymmetric shocks to the individual states, and to
what extent does it provide systematic redistribution from rich to poor states.
A first result is that fiscal equalization provides almost no insurance against asymmetric
shocks to state GDPs. Furthermore, it provides very little redistribution from states with high
to states with low per-capita GDPs. In contrast, fiscal equalization perfectly insures state
budgets against fluctuations in per capita tax collections around the federal average. Fiscal
equalization also results in significant redistribution of tax revenues from states where per
capita tax collections are low to states where per capita tax revenues are high. Both the
degree of insurance provided and the extent of tax-revenue redistribution have increased
over time. Thus, fiscal equalization in Germany can be best understood as a system for
risksharing and redistribution among state governments rather than consumers in different
states. The model presented in section 2 of this paper suggests that this can be explained by
the desire to insure risk-averse consumers against fluctuations in the provision of local public
goods.
An important critique against fiscal equalization holds that large transfers among states lead
to adverse incentive effects for governments to develop and maintain a healthy tax base in
their own states. The model we present in section 2 shows that this argument is too simple. If
fiscal equalization provides significant insurance against shocks to tax revenues, an increase
in the transfers under fiscal equalization may well induce more rather than less tax effort. The
reason is that local governments are encouraged to produce more public goods if fiscal
equalization allows for a steadier supply of these goods over time.
In the last section of this paper, we show that the elasticity of state tax revenues with regard
to fluctuations in state GDPs has steadly declined over the 35 years under consideration.
This is weakly consistent with the view that more redistribution among states leads to lower
tax effort. But the empirical evidence suggests that the argument has been overplayed in the
recent debate about fiscal equalization in Germany.2
1. Introduction
Fiscal arrangements for sharing income risk and redistributing income across
different regions of a national state or across the states forming a federation have
received considerable interest in recent research. Much of this interest was sparked
by the preparation of European Monetary Union during the 1990s.The literature has
looked at such arrangements from two different angles. Following the tradition of
Mundell’s (1961) analysis of currency unions, one branch of the literature considers
the importance of fiscal arrangements among regions or states sharing the same
currency as mechanisms for regional economic stabilization, i.e., as a substitute for
exchange rate flexibility. The basic idea of this approach is nicely summarized in a
quote by Jacques Delors, the former president of the European Commission, in the
Delors-Report (1989, p.89), the blueprint for European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU):
“... in all federations, the different combinations of federal budgetary mechanisms have powerful
“shock-absorber” effects dampening the amplitude either of economic difficulties or of surges in
prosperity of individual states. This is both the product of, and the source of the sense of national
solidarity which all relevant economic and monetary unions share.”
 Following this approach, the MacDougall Report (European Commission,
1977a, b), which considered the conditions for monetary union in Europe already in
the 1970s, and, more recently, Sachs and Sala-I-Martin (1991), von Hagen (1992),
Goodhart and Smith (1993), Bayoumi and Masson (1997, 1998), Melitz and Zumer
(1998) provide empirical estimates of the extent to which fiscal arrangements in
existing federations provide insurance against region or state-specific shocks to
aggregate output. The empirical results of the more recent  studies indicate that
federal fiscal arrangements in practice absorb between 10 and 20  percent of the
impact of asymmetric shocks, much less than Delors’ quote would suggest.
1
The other branch of the literature considers the role of national or federal fiscal
arrangements for consumption risk-sharing among consumers living in different
regions of a country or federation (Persson and Tabellini 1996a, b; Bucovetsky
1998). Here, the motivation is that fiscal arrangements may improve consumption
smoothing in the presence of incomplete capital markets. Empirical contributions
following this approach include Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993), Sorensen and Yosha3
(1997), Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), van Wincoop (1995) and
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1998). Persson and Tabellini (1996a,b) analyze the
political economy of regional risk-sharing arrangements. They argue that  there is a
trade-off between redistribution and risk-sharing among the regions of a federation
and find that underinsurance is a likely outcome of inter-governmental transfer
schemes.
The empirical work in both strands of this literature has concentrated on the
US and Canada and provided only some evidence for other federations or nations.
This paper provides new empirical evidence of the risk-sharing and redistributive
properties of fiscal equalization in Germany. Germany is a particularly interesting
case in this context, because, like Canada and in contrast to the US, it has an
explicit, formula-based mechanism for fiscal equalization, Finanzausgleich (FA),
which is defined by the federal constitution.
2 The German case has not received
much attention in the empirical literature, most likely because of the intricacies of the
formal arrangement and the difficulties to find the appropriate data.
In section II, we begin our analysis with the development of a stylized model of
horizontal fiscal equalization. The model serves to motivate an important point in the
empirical work, i.e., the distinction between fiscal equalization targeting differentials
in private sector incomes across regions and fiscal equalization targeting regional
government tax collections. By focusing entirely on regional risk sharing, the existing
literature misses important aspects of fiscal equalization in Germany, where
interregional transfers to households play only a minor role.
3
 Section III gives a description of FA. In section IV, we explore the extent to
which it serves as a buffer against regional income shocks and against shocks to
local government tax collections. Furthermore, we explore the redistributional
aspects of FA, both in terms of per capita GDPs and state tax revenues. We find,
first, that FA provides no insurance against state-specific income shocks and very
small redistribution relative to state-specific differences in per-capita GDP. Second,
we find that FA provides perfect insurance of state tax revenues against asymmetric
shocks and very significant redistribution of state tax collections. Thus, FA is best
                                                                                                                                                                            
1 See von Hagen (2000) for a review of the empirical results.
2 As in Canada, equalization is considered to be an outflow of a constitutional mandate to provide
equal living conditions for all citizens throughout the federation.
3 Kunz (2000) shows that such transfers are provided to some extent by Germany’s unemployment
insurance.4
understood as a mechanism for insuring state budgets rather than regional
economies and for equalizing the distribution of tax revenues across states.
The observation that FA redistributes tax revenues among the states of
Germany has lead to the argument that it creates negative incentives for states
collecting taxes and developing their tax bases (e.g. Baretti et al 2000; Büttner 1999).
Our theoretical model suggests that this argument is too simple, as it neglects the
insurance aspect of horizontal equalization. In the last part of section IV, we show
that the link between state tax collections and GDP is weak in Germany, and has
become weaker over time. The evidence is consistent with the operation of negative
incentive effects, but these effects may be weaker than what is generally suggested
in the public debate. Section V concludes.
II. Principles of Regional Risk Sharing and Redistribution
In a world of perfect capital markets, the government has no role in providing
private consumers with insurance against income shocks, as every individual could
buy the amount of insurance he desires in the market. Insurance against regional
shocks can be achieved by cross-ownership of productive assets or through lending
and borrowing on credit markets. There might still be fiscal arrangements for
redistributing income between individuals living in different regions of a country, but
these would target permanent income differentials across regions rather than deal
with region-specific income risk. In a world with incomplete capital markets, however,
consumption smoothing can be improved by fiscal transfers between regions.
Consider a federation consisting of i = 1, …,N states. There is a representative
consumer in each state who receives a stochastic income yit with expected value
E(yit) = y + Di and a fixed variance si
2. Subsequently, we let all variables without a
state index i denote per capita averages across all regions. Thus, y is average
expected income across all states, and Di is the difference between this and the
representative consumer’s expected income in state i. We normalize the variance of
aggregate income yt to one. Note that the correlation between state-specific and
aggregate income, ri, is generally different from zero. The representative consumer
in state i pays taxes tit to the state government, which uses the proceeds to provide
its citizens with a public good, git. To simplify, we abstract from private and public
sector borrowing. In each state i, government tax collections are a random variable5
with expected value Etit = t + di > 0 and a fixed variance qi
2. Obviously, the distribution
of tax collections in each state is constrained to assure that tit < yit. In the absence of
any transfers across regions, the representative consumer’s budget constraint is cit =
yit - tit , and the state government’s budget constraint is git = tit. The representative
consumer’s preferences are given by a utility function Ui(cit, git) with positive and
decreasing marginal utility in both arguments.
Our model has two channels of region-specific risk: shocks to state income,
and shocks to state tax collections. State tax collections and incomes in state i are
not necessarily perfectly correlated, as the state government may collect taxes on
things other than incomes, the income elasticity of tax revenues may be small, and
there may be lags between the generation of incomes and tax collections.
The literature typically considers regional transfer mechanisms providing direct
consumption smoothing by pooling regional income risk across regions. It is achieved
by a transfer mechanism that collects payments from citizens in individual regions
proportional to their incomes and pays transfers proportional to average per capita
income. We assume that, due to constitutional constraints, the tax and transfer rates
are the same for all citizens in the country, and that the mechanism cannot
distinguish between actual and expected income. Thus, if a transfer mechanism
aiming at consumption smoothing is in place, individuals in state i receive a net
transfer of t(yt - yit), where 0 £ t £ 1. These transfers may, of course, run through the
budgets of the state governments, but receipts and payments net out, as they are
paid directly to households.
An alternative transfer mechanism collects and pays transfers between the
state governments on the basis of their tax collections. This intergovernmental
transfer scheme makes governments collecting higher than average tax revenues
pay a part of their receipts to governments collecting less than average tax revenues.
Thus, the net transfer is b(tt – tit ), where 0 £  b £ 1.
With these transfer systems in place we can now reformulate the consumer’s
and the state budget constraints.
(1) cit  =  tyt + (1-t)yit - tit
(2) git =  btt +(1-b)tit.6
To derive some characteristics of regional transfer schemes aiming at risk
sharing, we now ask, what are the parameters t and b the representative household
in state i would choose? We answer this question by deriving the parameters that
maximize the representative household’s expected utility given the budget
constraints (1) and (2).
Consider first the optimal mechanism for transfers paid to households from the
point of view of consumers in region i.
(3)  ,
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c is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute consumption risk aversion.
Equation (3) contains a number of insights into the properties of regional
transfer arrangements. First, since the mechanism does not distinguish between
expected and unexpected incomes, it has a purely redistributive part represented by
the first term. Regions with relatively low expected incomes would prefer more
redistribution, while regions with relatively high expected incomes might even prefer
no income smoothing at all.
Second, the optimal risk-sharing arrangement depends on the stochastic
characteristics of a region, indicated by the second term of equation (3).  In the
absence of any differences in expected per capita incomes, the desired degree of
consumption smoothing increases as the correlation coefficient declines, i.e., the
insurability of incomes across regions increases. Furthermore, the desired degree of
consumption smoothing increases with the variance of regional per-capita income
relative to the volatility of aggregate per-capita income, unless the correlation
coefficient ri is large. Intuitively, high-risk regions desire a larger degree of
consumption smoothing than low-risk regions.
Third, equation (3) shows that regions with different characteristics desire
different consumption smoothing arrangements. The design of a federal system,
therefore, entails some compromise among the states. Persson and Tabellini discuss
the political economy of such a compromise. While details are beyond the scope of
this paper, two points are particularly noteworthy. First, in the presence of differences
in expected per-capita incomes across states, the political equilibrium implies a
trade-off between redistribution and consumption smoothing which may lead to
under-provision of the latter. Second, a political equilibrium may emerge, in which7
high-risk regions pay a permanent transfer to low-risk regions in return for obtaining a
higher degree of insurance than the low-risk regions would choose for themselves.
Thus, a federal arrangement for consumption smoothing may lead to permanent,
unconditional transfers even when the expected per capita incomes are the same in
all states.
Next, we consider the optimal arrangement for transfers between state
governments from the point of view of the representative consumer in
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where pi is the correlation coefficient between regional and aggregate per capita tax
revenues, wi is an index of the relative volatility of state to average per capital tax
collections, wi = qi/q, and ri
g is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion with
regard to the local public good.
  Equation (4) shows that the choice of the transfer mechanism between state
governments is determined by similar considerations as the transfer mechanism that
pays transfers directly to households. As before, the transfer mechanism has a
redistributive component, represented by the first term, and an insurance component,
aiming at smoothing state tax revenues over time. Nevertheless, equation (4) is
interesting in its own right, because it shows that there is a scope for horizontal fiscal
transfers among the states of a federation even if these transfers are uncorrelated
with regional income shocks and are not used to improve household consumption
smoothing.
An important aspect of horizontal transfer arrangements is that they may
create adverse incentives for the states’ tax collection efforts and the development of
tax resources (Migue, 1993). Indeed, the current debate on the reform of FA in
Germany  focuses strongly on the argument that state governments have too weak
incentives to improve tax collections or to develop new taxable resources, because
doing so does not pay for the individual government, as most of the additional
revenue generated is lost through FA. Baretti et al. (2000) provide empirical evidence
that suggests that reducing the amount of horizontal equalization in Germany would
increase state tax collections.
4
                                                       
4 In contrast, Smart and Bird (1996) argue that equalization creates positive incentive effects for state
tax collections, if poor states are rewarded for higher tax efforts by higher transfers.8
To explore the argument, let ti,t = E(ti,t) + ei,t and assume that expected tax
revenues differ across states only because state government make different efforts to
collect taxes. Thus, E(ti,t) is a measure of tax effort. Assume that state government i
can choose its tax effort before any shocks happen and that the government incurs a
cost of tax effort, W[E(ti,t)], with positive and increasing marginal cost. The state
government chooses its tax effort to maximize the welfare function Vi = Ui - W[(E(ti,t)].
We can then use the envelope theorem to derive the relation between tax effort and
the degree of insurance and redistribution achieved through the intergovernmental
transfer system.
(5)
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In equation (5), ai denotes the share of state i in national averages, gi = (1-b(1-ai)) is
the net revenue from an extra dollar of taxes to the state government, mj,i denotes the
expected value of the first (j=g), second (j=gg, cc) derivative of the utility function with
regard to the respective argument, rg,i
g  is the derivative of the ri
g, and Wtt,i is the
second derivative of the cost of tax effort. A closer look at equation (5) reveals that
the incentive effect of horizontal transfers among the state governments consists of
two elements. The first two terms summarize the conventional argument about
redistributive transfers. Assuming that the denominator of (5) is negative (i.e., not
dominated by mcc,i ), an increase in the transfer parameter b reduces optimal state tax
effort. This effect is stronger for small states and for states with relatively low tax
efforts (i.e., with di < 0.).
5
The third term brings in the state government’s demand for insurance against
asymmetric tax shocks. This term is negative, if risk aversion with regard to the public
good is strong, and its derivative is not too large. Indeed, it seems plausible that the
degree of risk aversion with regard to local public goods is quite high. If so,
increasing the transfer parameter encourages a state government to spend more tax
effort. Intuitively, offering more insurance against asymmetric revenue shocks
encourages the government to choose a higher level of public goods provision, which
in turn requires higher tax effort. Thus, the empirical observation of a large transfer
parameter b does not imply that state governments are vexed with adverse9
incentives regarding their efforts spent on tax collection and the improvement of local
tax sources.
III. Finanzausgleich: Fiscal Equalization in Germany
Finanzausgleich is an arrangement for redistributing tax revenues among the
states and the federal government of Germany.
6 The original federal constitution
assigned all taxes of unambiguous local incidence to the states, among them
personal and corporate income taxes and business taxes, and all other taxes to the
federal government. Apart from some minor taxes, this left the federal government
with sales taxes, which were later replaced by VAT. In order to secure it with a
sufficient revenue base, a third of personal and corporate income tax revenue was
given to the federal government, this share climbed to 35 percent by 1969. The fiscal
constitution act (Finanzverfassungsgesetz) of 23 December 1955 instituted a
horizontal sharing arrangement among the states covering all revenues from state
taxes plus half of the local taxes collected by municipalities. From 1956 on, it
guaranteed every state a minimum of 88.75 percent of the federal average per capita
revenue from this tax base.
7 By 1959, this minimum had climbed to 91 percent. In
1967, the federal government started paying supplementary transfers
(Ergänzungszuweisungen) to states with low tax capacities. The main goal of this
system according to the German constitution is to ‘create and secure uniform living
standards throughout Germany’ (Art.72 para 2(3) and Art.106 para 3(2)).
FA was reformed in 1969, when the federal government obtained half of the
revenue from corporate income tax, 42.5 percent of the revenue from personal
income tax, and 70 percent of the revenue from VAT.
8 The horizontal sharing
arrangement guaranteed each state a minimum of 95 percent of federal average per
capita revenues from all taxes included in the arrangement, i.e., all state taxes and
half of the revenue from local taxes. Frequent changes of the formula for distributing
tax revenues occurred in the years since then.
                                                                                                                                                                            
5 Note that for b < 1, mig > m jg  if di < dj.
6 Seperate arrangements for fiscal equalization at the municipal level exist in all states.
7 Equalization arrangements prior to 1956 guaranteed every state a minimum of 61.25 percent of the
federal average per capita tax revenue.
8 15 percent of the revenue from personal income tax was given to the muicipalities.10
FA evolves in three stages. At the first stage, 75 percent of their share in VAT
are distributed among the states on an equal per-capita basis.
9 The remaining 25
percent are used to make payments to states with per capita revenues from all state
taxes of less than 92 percent of the federal average. If the amount available for
redistribution is not enough, the transfers are cut accordingly.
10 If the amount
available is more than what is needed, the remainder is distributed among the
financially strong states on a per-capita basis.
At the second stage, tax capacities and resource needs are calculated for all
states. Tax capacity is determined by the sum of state tax revenues
11 and 50 percent
of the local taxes collected on a state’s territory. Resource needs are calculated as
the average per capita tax revenues in Germany multiplied by the population of the
respective state. At this stage, the special financial needs of the city states Hamburg
and Bremen are recognized by attributing them with larger than actual populations.
The difference between tax capacity and resource needs determines whether a state
pays or receives transfers under FA. Financially weak states receive payments which
lift them to at least 92 percent of federal average per capita tax revenues. If a state’s
revenues are between 92 and 100 percent of the federal per capita average, it
receives transfers that amount to 37.5 percent of that difference. If a state’s tax
revenues are above 102 percent of the national average, it pays a contribution to FA.
For per capita revenues between 102 and 110 percent of the federal average, the
contribution is equal to 70 percent of the difference, for per capita revenues above
110 percent of the federal average, the contribution is 100 percent of the difference
between the state’s revenues and the federal average.  As a result, the differences in
per capita tax revenues among the states range between 95 percent and 104.4
percent of the federal average.
At the third stage, payments from the federal government to the states are
made to further reduce the differences in per capita revenues. These supplementary
transfers are general-purpose grants which are computed on the basis of special
financial needs and the per capita VAT revenue of the financially weak states.
                                                       
9 The actual formula is complicated by the fact that Hamburg and Bremen are attributed artificially
higher populations to reflect their special needs as port cities.
10 In this case, however, financially weak states are guaranteed the amount they would receive if  the
entire share of the states in VAT were distributed on a per-capital basis.
11 These tax revenues include the states’ share of the income tax, corporate tax, trade tax, wealth tax,
inheritance tax, car tax, beer tax, lottery tax, as well as the share of the VAT revenue for the states.11
FA was reformed again in 1995, when the new East German states were
brought into the arrangement. For per capita revenues between 100 and 101 percent
of the federal average the contribution is now 15 percent of the difference, for per
capita revenues between 101 and 110 percent of the federal average, it is 66 percent
of the difference, for per capita revenues above 110 per cent of the federal avergae,
it is 80 percent of the difference. Contributing states must be left with at least 95
percent of the average per capita revenues after redistribution. Together with the
supplementary payments, all states have at least 99.5 percent of the average per
capita revenues.
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1.22 2.68 0.00 0.92 0.45 1.48  0.02 0.55
Note: All variables in DM of 1991
Table 1 reports some basic statistics characterizing FA. In 1961, the difference
between the largest and the smallest per capita GDP among the 10 West German
states was 70 percent of the average GDP per capita, the standard deviation
amounted to 22 percent. In 1994, the range of per capita incomes was 82.5 percent
of average per capita GDP, while the standard deviation was 25 percent. This
indicates a significant and slightly increasing degree of variation in per capita
incomes among the 10 West German states. The range of per capita tax revenues
was 127 percent of average per capita taxes in 1961, compared to 45 percent in
1994. For tax revenues, the standard deviation was 38 percent of the average in
1961, and 12 percent in 1994. Thus, there was a strong convergence of per capita
tax revenues among the states during this period.
Turning to the transfers under FA, the table shows that the average payment
made at stage 3 was small in both periods. Measuring transfers relative to state
GDP, the largest transfer received was 2.68 percent in 1961 and 1.48 percent in
1994, while the largest transfer paid was 1.98 percent of GDP in 1961, compared to12
0.20 percent in 1994. The average absolute transfer was 1.22 percent of state GDP
in 1961 and 0.45 percent in 1994. Finally, the standard deviation of transfers declined
substantially. Thus, the volume and dispersion of payments made under the
arrangement have come down over the 34 years under consideration.  During this
time period, Hessen and Bavaria are the only states that changed their positions from
large net recipients to large net contributors to the system. The position of the
remaining states did not change importantly.
IV. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we use panel data analysis to estimate the amount of risk
sharing and redistribution of tax revenues provided by the German FA. We use
annual data of the 10 West German states from 1961 to 1994, the last year before
the five East German states were included in FA. Data from earlier years are not
included because the state of Saarland joined the arrangement only in 1961. Thus,
our data consists of a balanced panel of ten states over 34 years. We use annual
GDP per capita to approximate incomes at the state level. These data were provided
by the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg. The tax data we use include all tax
revenues covered by FA, measured in per-capita terms. These data and the data
reporting the annual transfer flows among the states and between the states and the
federal government under FA are taken from the relevant legal documents fixing the
amounts to be paid and received.
12 We deflate all nominal variables with the West
German GDP deflator with base year 1991. We cut the sample in 1994, because the
East German states participate in FA since 1995, and there are no estimates of state
GDP available for these states.
In the analysis below, we focus on two questions: How much insurance
against asymmetric shocks and how much redistribution does FA achieve. We derive
empirical answers to these questions both with regard to asymmetric shocks and the
distribution of state tax revenues and with regard to asymmetric shocks and the
distribution of state GDPs. While there are no payments directly to individuals in
response income shocks as in our model above, transfers under FA might still
respond to asymmetric GDP shocks and, thus, provide an indirect insurance against
                                                       
12  1949-1955: "Verordnung zur Abrechnung des Finanzausgleichs unter den Ländern” for the years
1949-55, "Zweite Verordnung zur Durchführung des Länderfinanzausgleichs” for the years 1956-70,13
such shocks to the entire state.
13 As per capita GDP is a better proxy for a state’s
economic well being than per capita tax revenues, considering the redistributive
function with regard to GDP also seems of genuine interest.
IV.1. The Insurance Function of FA
To evaluate the insurance function of FA, we estimate the following equation:





















1 * b a
Here, xit is the flow into or out of state i’s budget in year t under FA, and yit
stands either for the state’s pre-FA tax collections or GDP. Including a time fixed
effect at, the term yit – yit-1 effectively stands for the asymmetric change in y in state i,
since the national average will be picked up by the time fixed effect. We also control
for state fixed effects, si . The coefficient ß then estimates the extent to which flows
under FA provide insurance against asymmetric tax revenue or GDP shocks.
Complete insurance is indicated by a coefficient of b=-1, partial insurance by values
between  minus one and zero.
The results of the regressions with respect to the GDP of the states are
summarized in Table 2. We report estimates for the flows at stage 1 of FA, stage 2,
the federal supplementary grants, and stage 3. The estimates are significantly
negative for stage 1 and stage 2. However, the adjusted R-squares and F-values
show that the regressions do not have much explanatory power. That is, the link
between flows under FA and fluctuations in state GDPs is statistically not very strong.
Including state fixed effects does not add explanatory power to these regressions.
Taking the estimates with time and state fixed effects, the transfers at the first stage
of FA offset an asymmetric GDP shock of one percent to a state by a payment of
0.013 percent of GDP, the transfers at the second stage increase this offset to 0.054
percent. Supplementary grants are not significantly linked to asymmetric changes in
GDP. However, including them in the total transfers (stage 3) reduces both the size
                                                                                                                                                                            
"Zweite Verordnung zur Durchführung des Gesetzes über den Finanzausgleich zwischen Bund und
Ländern” since 1971.
13 To the extent that welfare payments to individuals are paid out of state budgets and respond to
asymmetric shocks, FA would provide an indirect insurance against such shocks to individuals.14
of the offsetting coefficient and its statistical significance. Thus, supplementary grants
partially offset the insurance function of FA weak as it is already at the second stage.









Stage 1 Time -0.013 -2.53 0.94 (24,215) -0.01
Time and state -0.016 -2.59 0.74 (33,206) -0.04
Stage 2 Time -0.052 -5.45 2.07 (24,215) 0.10
Time and state -0.054 -5.45 1.65 (33,206) 0.08
Supplementary
grants
Time 0.013 0.86 2.01  (27,242) 0.09
Time and state 0.013 0.87 2.01 (36,233) 0.12
Stage 3 Time -0.035 -1.76 1.64 (24,215) 0.06
Time and state -0.034 -1.68 1.90 (33,206) 0.11
 To check the stability of the offsetting coefficients, we reestimated equation
(6) allowing for changes in the parameter b by including interactive slope dummies
for the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s. This is suggested by the fact that the rules and
parameters of FA were reformed in 1969, and modified several times on a more ad-
hoc basis in later years. The estimate for the 1970s, i.e., the first full decade of
operation under the 1969 reform,  are the standard of comparison in these tests. The
results, not reported here to save space, show that none of the dummy variables is
significant. We also estimated the equation with instruments for current income,
which did not change the results. Furthermore, including one and two lags of the
explanatory variable did not turn out to be significant. Overall, we conclude that FA
provides almost no insurance against asymmetric GDP shocks to states in Germany.
A very different picture emerges when we turn to the insurance function with
regard to tax revenues. Table 3 reports similar estimates with the annual changes in
tax revenues used as the explanatory variable. Here, we see that the offset
coefficients are negative and highly significant for the transfers at the first and second
stage. An asymmetric drop in state tax revenues is offset by a transfer of 32 percent
at the first stage and 88 percent at the second stage. Thus, FA provides partial
insurance against asymmetric shocks to state tax revenues at the first stage and
almost complete insurance at the second stage. However, supplementary grants
work in the opposite direction and, therefore, reduce the overall amount of insurance
provided at the third stage of FA to 56 percent. As before, including state fixed effects15
does not make a difference in the results. Again, we estimated equation (6) including
lags of the explanatory variable on the right hand side, but these did not appear
significantly.









Stage 1 Time -0.320 -9.56 4.74  (24,215) 0.27
Time and state -0.324 -9.32 3.37  (33, 206) 0.25
Stage 2 Time -0.865 -27.09 34.09 (24,215) 0.77
Time and state -0.878 -27.03 25.31 (33,206) 0.77)
Supplementary
grants
Time  0.081  1.54  2.04 (27,242) 0.09
Time and state  0.078  1.10  2.05 (36,233) 0.12
Stage 3 Time -0.563 -4.27 2.43 (24,215) 0.13
Time and state -0.555 -4.26 2.59 (33,206) 0.18
Table 4 reports the estimates of the coefficient b allowing for parameter
changes over time. Note that the total effect is now the sum of the coefficient
estimated for the 1970s plus the coefficient estimated for any other subperiod. While
there is no significant difference in the insurance provided during the 1960s and
1970s, the total effect increases from (-0.70) to –(0.92) in the 1980s, i.e., FA provided
more insurance of state tax revenues in the 1980s than in the earlier decades. This is
reversed, however, in the 1990s, where the additional effect estimated is only (-0.17)
and is not statistically significant.
Including supplementary grants in the evaluation of FA (stage 3) gives an even
more dramatic result. Here, we find that the insurance provided by the system
remained the same throughout 1961-1989. In the 1990s, however, the combined
effect of FA changes sign.This indicates that FA including supplementary grants had
a destabilizing effect on state tax revenues in the 1990s.
Table 4: Stability Tests for Slope Parameters
Stage 2 Stage 3
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
1961-69 -0.040 -0.53  0.020 0.10
1970-79 -0.699 -24.6 -0.774 -10.62
1980-89 -0.219 -3.01 -0.098 -0.52
1990-94 -0.169 -1.78   1.153 4.7416
IV.2  Redistribution Through Finanzausgleich
To assess the redistributive function of FA, we estimate the following equation:















Here, xt and yt denote the federal average per capita values of the respective
variables. As before, ￿ t’s are time fixed effects and the si are state fixed effects. The
coefficient g thus estimates the response of transfer flows under FA to a state’s
deviation from the average per capita tax revenue or GDP. FA reduces differences in
per capita tax revenues or GDP, if g < 0.
Estimates of equation (7) with time fixed effects alone tell us how transfers
under FA respond to the difference between the per-capita GDP of state i and
national average per-capita GDP controlling for common trends and business cycle.
This difference consists of a permanent and a transitory part. The former is due to
long-term differences in the relative income position of state i reflecting its economic
development relative to that national average. The latter is due to fluctuations around
this long-run relative position over time. Estimating equation (7) with time and state
fixed effects separates these two effects, as the state fixed effects pick up the
permanent component of the transfers, and the slope parameter reflects the short-
run component.
Table 5 reports the redistributive effects of FA with regard to GDP per capita.
The estimates with time fixed effects only indicate a significant but very small
redistributive effect. At the first stage, a difference of per capita GDP of DM 100
between state i and the federal average is compensated by a reduction in FA
transfers by 50  pfennig. Stage 2 raises the effect to DM 1.8, stage 3 to DM 2.1.
Estimates with time and state fixed effects lead to a dramatic increase in the adjusted
R-squares, but a loss of significance of the slope coefficient at stage 1 and stage 2.
This indicates that the redistributive function with regard to GDP is a permanent one,
FA does almost nothing at these stages to compensate states for fluctuation around
their long-run relative income positions. However, estimating equation (7) with time
and state fixed effects at stage 3 leads to a larger and more significant slope
coefficient. This is not surprising. It shows that the supplementary grants, which can
be paid with more discretion than the formula-based transfers at stage 1 and stage 2,17
are used to compensate states for temporary fluctuations around their relative
income positions.









Stage 1 Time -0.005 -7.91 2.59 (25,224) 0.14
Time and state 0.00 -0.20 33.74 (34,215) 0.82
Stage 2 Time -0.018 -8.21 2.84   (25,224) 0.16
Time and state -0.044 -6.26 42.55 (34,215) 0.85
Supplementary
grants
Time -0.003 -2.33 1.52  (28,251) 0.05
Time and state -0.029 -3.50 3.43 (37,242) 0.24
Stage 3 Time -0.021 -6.74 2.26  (25,224) 0.11
Time and state -0.082 -6.71 25.01 (34,215) 0.77
Table 6 reports our estimates of equation (7) with time and state fixed effects
and time-varying slope coefficients. Recalling that the total redistributive effect for
each subperiod is the sum of the coefficient reported for 1970-1979 plus the
coefficient reported for the subperiod, we see that the marginal redistributive effect
was larger in the 1960s than in the 1970s, and has declined since then. Thus, in the
early 1990s, FA had almost no marginal redistributive effect at stage 2, and only half
of the effect it had in the 1970s at stage 3. This suggests that the permanent
transfers paid under FA do little to equalize the income distribution among the states.
Table 6: Time-varying Slope Parameters
Stage 2 Stage 3
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
1961-69 -0.030  -17.27 -0.030 -9.00
1970-79 -0.039 -9.40 -0.064 -8.06
1980-89  0.017 10.93 0.017   5.53
1990-94  0.028 14.47  0.031   8.22
An alternative way to look at the long-run redistributive function of FA is to look
at the correlation between the state fixed effects and the relative income position of
each state. The state fixed effects indicate the average transfers paid to a state
relative to the reference state, which is Baden-Württemberg in our estimation. Given
the small number of degrees of freedom in this exercise, we calculate the rank
correlation between the fixed effects and the per capita GDPs for the states. We do
this for two subperiods, 1960-79 and 1980-94. For the first subperiod, the rank
correlation between state fixed effects and average per capita GDPs is (-0.75) for the18
second stage of FA. This is significant at the one-percent level. For the second
subperiod, the rank correlation is close to zero and not significant.  Both rank
correlations are not significantly different from zero at stage 3 of FA. However,
excluding the two city states Hamburg and Bremen from this exercise, the rank
correlation becomes significantly negative for the second subperiod and stage 2, and
marginally significant (at the 10-percent level) and negative at stage 3 for the same
subperiod. Thus, the permanent redistributive effects are clearer when the special
situation of the two city states is taken into account.
Table 7 reports the redistributive effects of FA with regard to state per capita
tax revenues. Again, we find that the separation between permanent redistribution
and marginal redistribution is important. With time effects only, FA compensates a
state with per capita tax revenues of DM 100 less than the national average with a
transfer of DM 44 at stage 2 and DM 52 at stage 3. However, the marginal
redistributive effect is much stronger. Our estimates indicate that a state is
compensated fully for temporary per capita tax revenues less than the national
average at stage 2 of FA. At stage 3, the state even receives an total grant of DM
111 for a temporary loss of DM 100, i.e., it is beneficial for the state to be below its
permanent relative revenue position.









Stage 1 Time -0.104 -11.76 5.65 (25,224) 0.32
Time and state -0.125 -6.56 39.67 (34,215) 0.84
Stage 2 Time -0.436 -15.28 9.56  (25,224) 0.46
Time and state -1.018 -43.91 401.62 (34,215) 0.98
Supplementary
grants
Time -0.061 -3.39 1.78 (28,251) 0.07
Time and state -0.014 -0.29 2.92 (37,242) 0.20
Stage 3 Time -0.517 -11.72 6.10 (25,224) 0.34
Time and state -1.114 -10.68 32.81 (34,215) 0.81
Table 8 reports the estimates of equation (7) with time and state fixed effects and
time-varying coefficients. Consider the results without state fixed effects, first. The
estimates indicate that the redistributive effect at stage 2 of FA was stronger in the
1960s than in the 1970s. In the 1980s and 1990s, it has become weaker than in the
1970s. In contrast, there is no variation in the redistributive effect at stage 3 of FA.
Thus, the long-run redistributive function of the entire system has not changed19
significantly over time, although redistribution at the intermediate stage 2 did. This
suggests that the federal grants paid at stage 3 have compensated for the weaker
redistributive function at stage 2. Since FA at stage 2 is largely rule-based, and the
rule is negotiated among the states and the federal government, this indicates that
the states have been increasingly unwilling to support horizontal redistribution, and
have shifted the redistributive function to the federal level instead.
The results are different when we consider marginal redistribution, i.e., the estimates
including time and state fixed effects. For stage 2, we find that the marginal
redistributive function of FA was considerably weaker in the 1960s than the 1970s,
when it became almost fully offsetting. The increasing slope coefficient for the 1980s
and 1990s suggests that redistribution at the margin was weaker in this period than
in the 1970s. At stage 3, we find again a less redistributive effect of FA in the 1960s.
Overcompensation of marginal revenue differentials began in the 1970s, and became
somewhat but not significantly stronger in the 1990s.
Table 8: Time-varying Slope Parameters
Time Fixed Effects Time and State Fixed Effects





Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
1961-69 -0.06 -1.4 -0.03 -0.4  0.16 8.6 0.26  4.79
1970-79 -0.49 -13.4 -0.53 -9.83  -0.98 -28.2  -1.18  -11.7
1980-89 0.09 1.6 0.04 0.4  0.04 2.2  -0.04 -0.68
1990-94 0.18 2.2 0.04 0.3 0.05  1.7  -0.14 -1.68
As before, we calculated the correlations between the state fixed effects and
average per capita tax revenues in two subperiods, 1960-79 and 1980-94, to assess
the long-run redistributive function of FA. These correlations are close to zero and
not statistically significant both at stage 2 and 3 and for both time periods. Leaving
out the city states of Hamburg and Bremen, however, the rank correlation becomes (-
0.89) for stage 2 and the first subsample, which is statistically significant at the one-
percent level. For stage 2 and the second subperiod, the rank correlation is negative
but not significant. For stage 3, it is highly significantly negative for both subperiods.
This confirms the weaker redistributive function provided by stage 2 of FA in the later
part of the sample period. Furthermore, the results confirm that the federal
government uses its involvement at stage 3 to pay vertical transfers reducing
differences in per capita tax revenues among the states.20
IV.3. Incentive Effects for State Tax Collections
Critics of the German FA, including the economics press and Germany’s
Constitutional Court commonly argue that the redistributive properties of FA create
adverse incentives for the state governments to develop their tax capacities. The
reasoning is that governments lose all additional tax revenues through FA. If tax
capacity development is costly in terms of administrative or political effort, state
governments will reduce their efforts in view of these charges. The result would be an
insufficient development of the tax capacity of all states (Baretti et al, 2000).
Above, we have pointed out the ambiguity of this reasoning from a theoretical
point of view, as it neglects the insurance function of FA. The fact that Germany’s FA
provides very far-reaching insurance of state tax revenues suggests that this
argument is of some relevance at least in this context. Our empirical results so far
can shed some more light on the issue.
A first point to be noted is that the redistributive function of FA is very small
with regard to state GDP and large with regard to state tax revenue. Thus, FA has
only minor incentive implications for state development policies that aim at raising a
state’s long-term level of output. A second point is that incentive effects are likely to
depend more strongly on the long-term redistributive properties of FA and less on the
marginal redistribution. If this is true, Table 8 implies that the relevant estimate is a
charge on additional tax revenues of 52 percent rather than 100 percent. Thus, the
adverse effects are likely smaller than what looking at the formula for computing
transfers (and, hence, marginal redistribution) would imply.
To explore the issue further, we consider the following regression model of per
capita state collections:
(8)  , 0 it i t it y s tax c a a + + + =
where tax and y denote pre-FA per capita tax collections and per capita GDP,
respectively, si stands for the state fixed effects and at for time fixed effects. The
coefficient c thus indicates how tax collections in a state respond to deviations of
income from trend. Estimating this equation with a constant slope parameter first,
yield a coefficient c = 0.0156, with a t-value of 4.36. The adjusted R-square is 0.98.
We then estimate this equation with time-varying slope coefficients to see how the
income elasticity of tax collections changed over time. The results are reported in
Table 9.21
Table 9: Time-varying Slope Parameters
Time fixed effects Time and state fixed effects
1960-69 0.045  (10.74) 0.034  (12.26)
1970-79 0.067   (29.41) 0.043  (10.98)
1980-89 -0.013  (-4.48) -0.009  (-5.74)
1990-94 -0.024  (-7.60) -0.018  (-9.13)
Note: T-ratios in parentheses.
The table indicates that the income elasticity of tax collections has weakened
considerable over time. In the 1960s, per capita tax revenues increased by DM 11.20
in response to a DM 100 increase in per capita GDP. This was reduced to DM 6.70 in
the 1970s, and to DM 4.30 in the 1990s.
This observation is indeed consistent with the hypothesis that state efforts to
collect taxes on current income and economic activity declined over time. Recall that
the largest change in the redistributive properties occurred between the 1960s and
the 1970s. The finding that the same is true for the income elasticity of state tax
collections is suggestive support at least of the notion that FA created adverse
incentives for state tax efforts. However, the income elasticity of state tax collections
continued to go down even when there were no further significant changes in the
redistributive properties of FA. This suggests that FA did not play much of a role in
the more recent weakening of state tax collections.
V. Conclusion
This paper presents an analysis of fiscal equalization among the states of the
Federal Republic of Germany . Fiscal equalization is a formula-based mechanism
redistributing tax revenues between the states, augmented by vertical payments from
the Federal Government to individual states. It is an outflow of the constitutional
mandate to secure equal living conditions for all citizens in the country.
  The theoretical model discussed in this paper shows that, apart from pure
income redistribution, fiscal equalization can be motivated by considerations of
regional risk sharing among consumers living in different states. Regional risk
sharing may aim at insuring consumer incomes against asymmetric, region-specific
shocks. Alternatively, regional risk-sharing may aim at insuring state budgets against
asymmetric tax revenue shocks, enabling states to smooth the provision of local22
public goods over time. Counter to conventional wisdom, transfer payments between
states do not create adverse incentive effects for states leading to a reduction in tax
effort and an insufficient development of local tax bases, if the motivation to insure
state budgets against such shocks is sufficiently strong.
Our empirical analysis explores the insurance and redistributive properties of
fiscal equalization in Germany, using data from 1961 to 1994. We find that the
distinction between insurance aiming at private sector incomes and insurance aiming
at state budgets is important. Transfers under fiscal equalization do not correlate
strongly with asymmetric shocks to state GDPs. They do, however, strongly offset
asymmetric shocks to state tax collections. We conclude that Germany’s fiscal
equalization is better characterized as an insurance against tax revenue shocks than
as a mechanism for offsetting asymmetric shocks to regional incomes.
Similarly, the redistributive properties of fiscal equalization are better
characterized with regard to state tax incomes than with regard to per capita GDPs in
the states. Transfers under fiscal equalization respond only weakly to differences in
per capita GDP across the states. In contrast, they do offset differences in state tax
revenues per capita.  This offsetting effect is perfect at the margin, but only about fifty
percent in the long run. Since the 1970s, redistribution of tax revenues at the margin
even overcompensates tax revenue differentials. Thus, states may be better off in
times of temporary tax revenue losses than in times of positive revenue shocks.
The result that fiscal equalization leads to significant redistribution of tax
revenues across states implies that there is a potential for adverse incentive effects
on state tax collections. To explore this issue, we estimate tax revenue functions to
see if the link between tax collections and local GDP has changed over time. Our
results show that this link has, indeed, become significantly weaker over the 34 years
under consideration. This is consistent with the proposition that states have paid less
effort on tax enforcement in response to more redistribution of tax revenues through
fiscal equalization. However, this effect seems to have been strongest between the
1960s and the 1970s. The ongoing weakening of the link between economic activity
and tax collections in the 1980s and 1990s in the German states can hardly be
attributed to fiscal equalization.23
References
Asdrubali, Pierfederica, Bent Sørensen, and Oved Yosha (1996), “Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United
States 1963-1990.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 1081-1110
Athanasoulis, Stefano, and Eric van Wincorp (1998), “Risksharing Within the United States: What Have Financial
Markets and Fiscal Federalism Accomplished?”, Research Paper 9808, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Atkeson, Andrew, and Tamim Bayoumi (1993), “Do Private Capital Markets Insure Regional Risk? Evidence for
the US and Europe.” Open Economies Review 4, 303-24
Baretti, Christian, Bernd Huber, and Karl Lichtblau (2000), “ A Tax on Tax revenue. The Incentive Effects of
Equalizing transfers: Evidence from Germany.” Mimeo, ifo Institute München
Bayoumi, Tamim, and Paul R. Masson (1998), “Liability-creating Versus Non-liability-creating Fiscal Stabilization
Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stabilization, and EMU.” Economic Journal 108, 1026-45
Bayoumi, Tamim, and Paul R. Masson (1997), “The Efficiency of National and Regional Stabilization Policies.” in:
Jean-Olivier Hairault, Pierre-Yves Hénin, and Franck Portier (eds.), Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Stability.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Bayoumi, Tamim, and Paul Masson (1995), “Fiscal Flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for Monetary
Union in Europe.” European Economic Review 39, 253-74
Bucovetsky, Sam (1998), “Federalism, Equalization, and Risk-sharing.” Journal of Public Economics
67, 301-28
Büttner, Thiess (1999), “Regional stabilization by Fiscal Equalization. Theoretical Considerations and
Empirical Evidence from Germany.” Mimeo, Mannheim: ZEW
Delors, Jacques (1989), “Regional Implications of Economic and Monetary Integration.” in: committee for the
Study of Economic and Monetary Union (ed.), Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European
Community. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC.
European Commission (1977a), Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public finance in European Integration
Vol. I, Studies: Economic and Financial Series A13, Brussels
European Commission (1977b), Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public finance in European Integration
Vol. II, Studies: Economic and Financial Series B13, Brussels
Fatas, Antonio (1998), “Does EMU need a Fiscal Federation?” Economic Policy 26
Goodhart, Charles E. A., and Stephen Smith (1993), “Stabilization” in: European Commission, The Economics of
Community Public Finance, European Economy Reports and Studies 5, 417-55
Kurz, Claudia (2000), “Regional risk Sharing and Redistribution by the Unemployment Insurance system: The
Case of Germany.” Mimeo, Europa University Viadrina.
Mélitz, Jacques, and Silvia vori (1993), “National Insurance Against Unevenly distributed Shocks in a European
Monetary Union.” Recherches Economiques de Louvain 59, 81-104
Mélitz, Jacques, and Frédéric Zumer (1998), “Regional Redistribution and Stabilization by the Centre in Canada,
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States: New Estimates Based on Panel Data Econometrics.” CEPR
Discussion Paper 1829
Migué, Jean-Luc (1993), Federalism and Free Trade. Hobart Paper, London: Institute of Economic Affairs
Mundell, Robert (1961), “A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas.” American Economic Review 51
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Giovanni Peri (1998), “Regional Non-Adjustment and Fiscal Policy.” Economic Policy 26
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (1996a), “Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard.”
Econometrica 64, 623-46
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (1996a), “Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution.”
Journal of Political Economy 104, 979-1009
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, and Jeffrey Sachs (1991), “Fiscal Federalism and Optimum currency Areas: Evidence for
europe from the United States.” in: Matthew Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli, and Paul Masson (eds.), Estabilishing a
Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the US, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press24
Sorensen, Bent E. and Oved Yosha (1997), “Federal Insurance of US States: An Empirical Investigation.” in: Assaf
Razin and Efraim Sadka (eds.), Globalization: Public Economics Policy Perspectives”, Cambridge University Press
van Wincoop, Eric (1995), “Regional Risksharing.” European Economic Review 39, 1545-68
von Hagen, Jürgen (1992), “Fiscal Arrangements in a Monetary Union - Some Evidence from the US.” in: Don Fair
and Christian de Boissieux (eds.), Fiscal Policy, Taxes, and the Financial System in an Increasingly Integrated
Europe Deventer: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
von Hagen, Jürgen (1993), “Monetary Union and Fiscal Union: A Perspective from Fiscal Federalism.” in: Paul R.
Masson and Mark P. Taylor (eds.), Policy Issues in the Operation of Currency Unions. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
von Hagen, Jürgen, and George W. Hammond (1998), “Regional Insurance Against Asymmetric Shocks: An
Empirical Study for the European Community.” The Manchester School 66, 331-53
von Hagen, Jürgen (2000), “Regional Insurance Against Asymmetric Shocks.” In: Greg Hess and Eric van
Wincoop (eds.), Intranational Macroeconomics2008
B01-08 Euro-Diplomatie durch gemeinsame „Wirtschaftsregierung“ Martin Seidel
2007
B03-07 Löhne und Steuern im Systemwettbewerb der Mitgliedstaaten
der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B02-07 Konsolidierung und Reform der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B01-07 The Ratiﬁcation of European Treaties - Legal and Constitutio-
nal Basis of a European Referendum.
Martin Seidel
2006
B03-06 Financial Frictions, Capital Reallocation, and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations
Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B02-06 Financial Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B01-06 A Welfare Analysis of Capital Account Liberalization Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
2005
B11-05 Das Kompetenz- und Entscheidungssystem des Vertrages von
Rom im Wandel seiner Funktion und Verfassung
Martin Seidel
B10-05 Die Schutzklauseln der Beitrittsverträge Martin Seidel
B09-05 Measuring Tax Burdens in Europe Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B08-05 Remittances as Investment in the Absence of Altruism Gabriel González-König
B07-05 Economic Integration in a Multicone World? Christian Volpe Martincus, Jenni-
fer Pédussel Wu
B06-05 Banking Sector (Under?)Development in Central and Eastern
Europe
Jürgen von Hagen, Valeriya Din-
ger
B05-05 Regulatory Standards Can Lead to Predation Stefan Lutz
B04-05 Währungspolitik als Sozialpolitik Martin Seidel
B03-05 Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate
and Teaching to Stay?
Panu Poutvaara
B02-05 Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior Jan Fidrmuc, Orla Doyle
B01-05 Macroeconomic Adjustment in the New EU Member States Jürgen von Hagen, Iulia Traistaru
2004
B33-04 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability On Foreign
Direct Investment Inﬂows: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B32-04 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Coun-
tries: A Mulitnominal Panal Analysis
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B31-04 Fear of Floating and Fear of Pegging: An Empirical Anaysis of
De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B30-04 Der Vollzug von Gemeinschaftsrecht über die Mitgliedstaaten
und seine Rolle für die EU und den Beitrittsprozess
Martin Seidel
B29-04 Deutschlands Wirtschaft, seine Schulden und die Unzulänglich-
keiten der einheitlichen Geldpolitik im Eurosystem
Dieter Spethmann, Otto Steiger
B28-04 Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-structural Cau-
ses
Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B27-04 Firm Performance and Privatization in Ukraine Galyna Grygorenko, Stefan Lutz
B26-04 Analyzing Trade Opening in Ukraine: Eﬀects of a Customs Uni-
on with the EU
Oksana Harbuzyuk, Stefan Lutz
B25-04 Exchange Rate Risk and Convergence to the Euro Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-04 The Endogeneity of Money and the Eurosystem Otto Steiger
B23-04 Which Lender of Last Resort for the Eurosystem? Otto Steiger
B22-04 Non-Discretonary Monetary Policy: The Answer for Transition
Economies?
Elham-Maﬁ Kreft, Steven F. Kreft
B21-04 The Eﬀectiveness of Subsidies Revisited: Accounting for Wage
and Employment Eﬀects in Business R+D
Volker Reinthaler, Guntram B.
Wolﬀ
B20-04 Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Cri-
ses
Jürgen von Hagen, Tai-kuang Ho
B19-04 Die Stellung der Europäischen Zentralbank nach dem Verfas-
sungsvertrag
Martin SeidelB18-04 Transmission Channels of Business Cycles Synchronization in
an Enlarged EMU
Iulia Traistaru
B17-04 Foreign Exchange Regime, the Real Exchange Rate and Current
Account Sustainability: The Case of Turkey
Sübidey Togan, Hasan Ersel
B16-04 Does It Matter Where Immigrants Work? Traded Goods, Non-
traded Goods, and Sector Speciﬁc Employment
Harry P. Bowen, Jennifer Pédussel
Wu
B15-04 Do Economic Integration and Fiscal Competition Help to Ex-
plain Local Patterns?
Christian Volpe Martincus
B14-04 Euro Adoption and Maastricht Criteria: Rules or Discretion? Jiri Jonas
B13-04 The Role of Electoral and Party Systems in the Development of
Fiscal Institutions in the Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries
Sami Yläoutinen
B12-04 Measuring and Explaining Levels of Regional Economic Inte-
gration
Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B11-04 Economic Integration and Location of Manufacturing Activi-
ties: Evidence from MERCOSUR
Pablo Sanguinetti, Iulia Traistaru,
Christian Volpe Martincus
B10-04 Economic Integration and Industry Location in Transition
Countries
Laura Resmini
B09-04 Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Souvereign Bond Markets: A
Uniﬁed Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence
Ayse Y. Evrensel, Ali M. Kutan
B08-04 European Integration, Productivity Growth and Real Conver-
gence
Taner M. Yigit, Ali M. Kutan
B07-04 The Contribution of Income, Social Capital, and Institutions to
Human Well-being in Africa
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B06-04 Rural Urban Inequality in Africa: A Panel Study of the Eﬀects
of Trade Liberalization and Financial Deepening
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B05-04 Money Rules for the Eurozone Candidate Countries Lucjan T. Orlowski
B04-04 Who is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for
EU Membership in the Candidate Countries’ Referenda
Orla Doyle, Jan Fidrmuc
B03-04 Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Opera-
tions Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender
Ulrich Bindseil
B02-04 Total Factor Productivity and Economic Freedom Implications
for EU Enlargement
Ronald L. Moomaw, Euy Seok
Yang
B01-04 Die neuen Schutzklauseln der Artikel 38 und 39 des Bei-
trittsvertrages: Schutz der alten Mitgliedstaaten vor Störungen
durch die neuen Mitgliedstaaten
Martin Seidel
2003
B29-03 Macroeconomic Implications of Low Inﬂation in the Euro Area Jürgen von Hagen, Boris Hofmann
B28-03 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability on Foreign
Direct Investment: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B27-03 The Performance of the Euribor Futures Market: Eﬃciency and
the Impact of ECB Policy Announcements (Electronic Version
of International Finance)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen
B26-03 Souvereign Risk Premia in the European Government Bond
Market (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterladen)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen, Ludger Schulknecht
B25-03 How Flexible are Wages in EU Accession Countries? Anna Iara, Iulia Traistaru
B24-03 Monetary Policy Reaction Functions: ECB versus Bundesbank Bernd Hayo, Boris Hofmann
B23-03 Economic Integration and Manufacturing Concentration Pat-
terns: Evidence from Mercosur
Iulia Traistaru, Christian Volpe
Martincus
B22-03 Reformzwänge innerhalb der EU angesichts der Osterweiterung Martin Seidel
B21-03 Reputation Flows: Contractual Disputes and the Channels for
Inter-Firm Communication
William Pyle
B20-03 Urban Primacy, Gigantism, and International Trade: Evidence
from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. Alwosabi
B19-03 An Empirical Analysis of Competing Explanations of Urban Pri-
macy Evidence from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. AlwosabiB18-03 The Eﬀects of Regional and Industry-Wide FDI Spillovers on
Export of Ukrainian Firms
Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra, Sang-Min Park
B17-03 Determinants of Inter-Regional Migration in the Baltic States Mihails Hazans
B16-03 South-East Europe: Economic Performance, Perspectives, and
Policy Challenges
Iulia Traistaru, Jürgen von Hagen
B15-03 Employed and Unemployed Search: The Marginal Willingness
to Pay for Attributes in Lithuania, the US and the Netherlands
Jos van Ommeren, Mihails Hazans
B14-03 FCIs and Economic Activity: Some International Evidence Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B13-03 The IS Curve and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Is there
a Puzzle?
Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B12-03 What Makes Regions in Eastern Europe Catching Up? The
Role of Foreign Investment, Human Resources, and Geography
Gabriele Tondl, Goran Vuksic
B11-03 Die Weisungs- und Herrschaftsmacht der Europäischen Zen-
tralbank im europäischen System der Zentralbanken - eine
rechtliche Analyse
Martin Seidel
B10-03 Foreign Direct Investment and Perceptions of Vulnerability to
Foreign Exchange Crises: Evidence from Transition Economies
Josef C. Brada, Vladimír Tomsík
B09-03 The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem: An Analy-
sis of the Missing Central Monetary Institution in European
Monetary Union
Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B08-03 The Determination of Capital Controls: Which Role Do Ex-
change Rate Regimes Play?
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B07-03 Nach Nizza und Stockholm: Stand des Binnenmarktes und
Prioritäten für die Zukunft
Martin Seidel
B06-03 Fiscal Discipline and Growth in Euroland. Experiences with the
Stability and Growth Pact
Jürgen von Hagen
B05-03 Reconsidering the Evidence: Are Eurozone Business Cycles
Converging?
Michael Massmann, James Mit-
chell
B04-03 Do Ukrainian Firms Beneﬁt from FDI? Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra
B03-03 Europäische Steuerkoordination und die Schweiz Stefan H. Lutz
B02-03 Commuting in the Baltic States: Patterns, Determinants, and
Gains
Mihails Hazans
B01-03 Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im rechtlichen und poli-
tischen Gefüge der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
2002
B30-02 An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Ass-
urance
Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul,
Tim Mennel
B29B-02 Trade Agreements as Self-protection Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B29A-02 Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B28-02 Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B27-02 Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time
Preference
Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B26-02 Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candi-
date Countries
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B25-02 Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors Stefan Lutz
B24-02 The Eﬀects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Stefan Lutz
B23-02 Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Martin Seidel
B22-02 Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse
des Eurosystems
Otto Steiger
B21-02 Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence Within the Tran-
sition Economies and to the European Union: Evidence from
Panel Data
Ali M. Kutan, Taner M. Yigit
B20-02 The Impact of News, Oil Prices, and International Spillovers
on Russian Fincancial Markets
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. KutanB19-02 East Germany: Transition with Uniﬁcation, Experiments and
Experiences
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R.
Strauch, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B18-02 Regional Specialization and Employment Dynamics in Transi-
tion Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B17-02 Specialization and Growth Patterns in Border Regions of Ac-
cession Countries
Laura Resmini
B16-02 Regional Specialization and Concentration of Industrial Activity
in Accession Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Peter Nijkamp, Si-
monetta Longhi
B15-02 Does Broad Money Matter for Interest Rate Policy? Matthias Brückner, Andreas Scha-
ber
B14-02 The Long and Short of It: Global Liberalization, Poverty and
Inequality
Christian E. Weller, Adam Hersch
B13-02 De Facto and Oﬃcial Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition
Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B12-02 Argentina: The Anatomy of A Crisis Jiri Jonas
B11-02 The Eurosystem and the Art of Central Banking Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B10-02 National Origins of European Law: Towards an Autonomous
System of European Law?
Martin Seidel
B09-02 Monetary Policy in the Euro Area - Lessons from the First Years Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B08-02 Has the Link Between the Spot and Forward Exchange Rates
Broken Down? Evidence From Rolling Cointegration Tests
Ali M. Kutan, Su Zhou
B07-02 Perspektiven der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B06-02 Is There Asymmetry in Forward Exchange Rate Bias? Multi-
Country Evidence
Su Zhou, Ali M. Kutan
B05-02 Real and Monetary Convergence Within the European Union
and Between the European Union and Candidate Countries: A
Rolling Cointegration Approach
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Su
Zhou
B04-02 Asymmetric Monetary Policy Eﬀects in EMU Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B03-02 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes: An Empirical Analysis
for Transition Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B02-02 The Euro System and the Federal Reserve System Compared:
Facts and Challenges
Karlheinz Ruckriegel, Franz Seitz
B01-02 Does Inﬂation Targeting Matter? Manfred J. M. Neumann, Jürgen
von Hagen
2001
B29-01 Is Kazakhstan Vulnerable to the Dutch Disease? Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Ali M. Ku-
tan, Michael L. Wyzan
B28-01 Political Economy of the Nice Treaty: Rebalancing the EU
Council. The Future of European Agricultural Policies
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B27-01 Investor Panic, IMF Actions, and Emerging Stock Market Re-
turns and Volatility: A Panel Investigation
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. Kutan
B26-01 Regional Eﬀects of Terrorism on Tourism: Evidence from Three
Mediterranean Countries
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B25-01 Monetary Convergence of the EU Candidates to the Euro: A
Theoretical Framework and Policy Implications
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-01 Disintegration and Trade Jarko and Jan Fidrmuc
B23-01 Migration and Adjustment to Shocks in Transition Economies Jan Fidrmuc
B22-01 Strategic Delegation and International Capital Taxation Matthias Brückner
B21-01 Balkan and Mediterranean Candidates for European Union
Membership: The Convergence of Their Monetary Policy With
That of the Europaen Central Bank
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-01 An Empirical Inquiry of the Eﬃciency of Intergovernmental
Transfers for Water Projects Based on the WRDA Data
Anna Rubinchik-Pessach
B19-01 Detrending and the Money-Output Link: International Evi-
dence
R.W. Hafer, Ali M. KutanB18-01 Monetary Policy in Unknown Territory. The European Central
Bank in the Early Years
Jürgen von Hagen, Matthias
Brückner
B17-01 Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline
in Latin American and Carribean Countries
Mark Hallerberg, Patrick Marier
B16-01 Sources of Inﬂation and Output Fluctuations in Poland and
Hungary: Implications for Full Membership in the European
Union
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B15-01 Programs Without Alternative: Public Pensions in the OECD Christian E. Weller
B14-01 Formal Fiscal Restraints and Budget Processes As Solutions to
a Deﬁcit and Spending Bias in Public Finances - U.S. Experi-
ence and Possible Lessons for EMU
Rolf R. Strauch, Jürgen von Hagen
B13-01 German Public Finances: Recent Experiences and Future Chal-
lenges
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R. Strauch
B12-01 The Impact of Eastern Enlargement On EU-Labour Markets.
Pensions Reform Between Economic and Political Problems
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B11-01 Inﬂationary Performance in a Monetary Union With Large Wa-
ge Setters
Lilia Cavallar
B10-01 Integration of the Baltic States into the EU and Institutions
of Fiscal Convergence: A Critical Evaluation of Key Issues and
Empirical Evidence
Ali M. Kutan, Niina Pautola-Mol
B09-01 Democracy in Transition Economies: Grease or Sand in the
Wheels of Growth?
Jan Fidrmuc
B08-01 The Functioning of Economic Policy Coordination Jürgen von Hagen, Susanne
Mundschenk
B07-01 The Convergence of Monetary Policy Between Candidate
Countries and the European Union
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B06-01 Opposites Attract: The Case of Greek and Turkish Financial
Markets
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B05-01 Trade Rules and Global Governance: A Long Term Agenda.
The Future of Banking.
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B04-01 The Determination of Unemployment Beneﬁts Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch
B03-01 Preferences Over Inﬂation and Unemployment: Evidence from
Surveys of Happiness
Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch, Andrew J. Oswald
B02-01 The Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory and Policy at Thir-
ty
Michele Fratianni, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
B01-01 Divided Boards: Partisanship Through Delegated Monetary Po-
licy
Etienne Farvaque, Gael Lagadec
2000
B20-00 Breakin-up a Nation, From the Inside Etienne Farvaque
B19-00 Income Dynamics and Stability in the Transition Process, ge-
neral Reﬂections applied to the Czech Republic
Jens Hölscher
B18-00 Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Roy Gardner,
Jürgen von Hagen, Claudia Keser
B17-00 Rückführung der Landwirtschaftspolitik in die Verantwortung
der Mitgliedsstaaten? - Rechts- und Verfassungsfragen des Ge-
meinschaftsrechts
Martin Seidel
B16-00 The European Central Bank: Independence and Accountability Christa Randzio-Plath, Tomasso
Padoa-Schioppa
B15-00 Regional Risk Sharing and Redistribution in the German Fede-
ration
Jürgen von Hagen, Ralf Hepp
B14-00 Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations in Transition Eco-
nomies: The Case of Poland and Hungary
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B13-00 Back to the Future: The Growth Prospects of Transition Eco-
nomies Reconsidered
Nauro F. CamposB12-00 Rechtsetzung und Rechtsangleichung als Folge der Einheitli-
chen Europäischen Währung
Martin Seidel
B11-00 A Dynamic Approach to Inﬂation Targeting in Transition Eco-
nomies
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B10-00 The Importance of Domestic Political Institutions: Why and
How Belgium Qualiﬁed for EMU
Marc Hallerberg
B09-00 Rational Institutions Yield Hysteresis Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B08-00 The Eﬀectiveness of Self-Protection Policies for Safeguarding
Emerging Market Economies from Crises
Kenneth Kletzer
B07-00 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in The EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B06-00 The Demand for Money in Austria Bernd Hayo
B05-00 Liberalization, Democracy and Economic Performance during
Transition
Jan Fidrmuc
B04-00 A New Political Culture in The EU - Democratic Accountability
of the ECB
Christa Randzio-Plath
B03-00 Integration, Disintegration and Trade in Europe: Evolution of
Trade Relations during the 1990’s
Jarko Fidrmuc, Jan Fidrmuc
B02-00 Inﬂation Bias and Productivity Shocks in Transition Economies:
The Case of the Czech Republic
Josef C. Barda, Arthur E. King, Ali
M. Kutan
B01-00 Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism Kenneth Kletzer, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
1999
B26-99 Skills, Labour Costs, and Vertically Diﬀerentiated Industries: A
General Equilibrium Analysis
Stefan Lutz, Alessandro Turrini
B25-99 Micro and Macro Determinants of Public Support for Market
Reforms in Eastern Europe
Bernd Hayo
B24-99 What Makes a Revolution? Robert MacCulloch
B23-99 Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B22-99 Partisan Social Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B21-99 The End of Moderate Inﬂation in Three Transition Economies? Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-99 Subnational Government Bailouts in Germany Helmut Seitz
B19-99 The Evolution of Monetary Policy in Transition Economies Ali M. Kutan, Josef C. Brada
B18-99 Why are Eastern Europe’s Banks not failing when everybody
else’s are?
Christian E. Weller, Bernard Mor-
zuch
B17-99 Stability of Monetary Unions: Lessons from the Break-Up of
Czechoslovakia
Jan Fidrmuc, Julius Horvath and
Jarko Fidrmuc
B16-99 Multinational Banks and Development Finance Christian E.Weller and Mark J.
Scher
B15-99 Financial Crises after Financial Liberalization: Exceptional Cir-
cumstances or Structural Weakness?
Christian E. Weller
B14-99 Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy in Germany Bernd Hayo and Birgit Uhlenbrock
B13-99 Fiancial Fragility or What Went Right and What Could Go
Wrong in Central European Banking?
Christian E. Weller and Jürgen von
Hagen
B12 -99 Size Distortions of Tests of the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity:
Evidence and Implications for Applied Work
Mehmet Caner and Lutz Kilian
B11-99 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B10-99 Financial Liberalization, Multinational Banks and Credit Sup-
ply: The Case of Poland
Christian Weller
B09-99 Monetary Policy, Parameter Uncertainty and Optimal Learning Volker Wieland
B08-99 The Connection between more Multinational Banks and less
Real Credit in Transition Economies
Christian WellerB07-99 Comovement and Catch-up in Productivity across Sectors: Evi-
dence from the OECD
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B06-99 Productivity Convergence and Economic Growth: A Frontier
Production Function Approach
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B05-99 Tumbling Giant: Germany‘s Experience with the Maastricht
Fiscal Criteria
Jürgen von Hagen and Rolf
Strauch
B04-99 The Finance-Investment Link in a Transition Economy: Evi-
dence for Poland from Panel Data
Christian Weller
B03-99 The Macroeconomics of Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch and Andrew J. Oswald
B02-99 The Consequences of Labour Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence
Based on Survey Data
Rafael Di Tella and Robert Mac-
Culloch
B01-99 The Excess Volatility of Foreign Exchange Rates: Statistical
Puzzle or Theoretical Artifact?
Robert B.H. Hauswald
1998
B16-98 Labour Market + Tax Policy in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B15-98 Can Taxing Foreign Competition Harm the Domestic Industry? Stefan Lutz
B14-98 Free Trade and Arms Races: Some Thoughts Regarding EU-
Russian Trade
Rafael Reuveny and John Maxwell
B13-98 Fiscal Policy and Intranational Risk-Sharing Jürgen von Hagen
B12-98 Price Stability and Monetary Policy Eﬀectiveness when Nomi-
nal Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero
Athanasios Orphanides and Volker
Wieland
B11A-98 Die Bewertung der "dauerhaft tragbaren öﬀentlichen Finanz-
lage"der EU Mitgliedstaaten beim Übergang zur dritten Stufe
der EWWU
Rolf Strauch
B11-98 Exchange Rate Regimes in the Transition Economies: Case Stu-
dy of the Czech Republic: 1990-1997
Julius Horvath and Jiri Jonas
B10-98 Der Wettbewerb der Rechts- und politischen Systeme in der
Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B09-98 U.S. Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy and the ESCB Robert L. Hetzel
B08-98 Money-Output Granger Causality Revisited: An Empirical Ana-
lysis of EU Countries (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterla-
den)
Bernd Hayo
B07-98 Designing Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Europe: So-
me Lessons from the U.S. EPA’s 33/50 Program
John W. Maxwell
B06-98 Monetary Union, Asymmetric Productivity Shocks and Fiscal
Insurance: an Analytical Discussion of Welfare Issues
Kenneth Kletzer
B05-98 Estimating a European Demand for Money (überarbeitete Ver-
sion zum Herunterladen)
Bernd Hayo
B04-98 The EMU’s Exchange Rate Policy Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B03-98 Central Bank Policy in a More Perfect Financial System Jürgen von Hagen / Ingo Fender
B02-98 Trade with Low-Wage Countries and Wage Inequality Jaleel Ahmad
B01-98 Budgeting Institutions for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline Jürgen von Hagen
1997
B04-97 Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency: Does
European Monetary Uniﬁcation Create a Need for Fiscal Ins-
urance or Federalism?
Kenneth Kletzer
B-03-97 Liberalising European Markets for Energy and Telecommunica-
tions: Some Lessons from the US Electric Utility Industry
Tom Lyon / John Mayo
B02-97 Employment and EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B01-97 A Stability Pact for Europe (a Forum organized by ZEI)ISSN 1436 - 6053
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 Tel.: +49-228-73-1732
D-53113 Bonn Fax: +49-228-73-1809
Germany www.zei.de